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OPINION 
________________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.  
 Appellants Franklin Thompson and Lamar Gibson 
appeal the District Court’s denial of their 18 U.S.C. 
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§ 3582(c)(2) motions for sentence reduction.1  Section 
3582(c)(2) permits a district court to exercise its discretion to 
reduce a sentence only if:  (1) the sentence is “based on” a 
Guidelines range that has subsequently been lowered; and (2) 
a sentence reduction would be consistent with the Sentencing 
Commission’s policy statements.  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 
 The Sentencing Commission’s policy statement 
applicable here prohibits a district court from reducing a 
defendant’s sentence unless a subsequent amendment to the 
Guidelines lowers the defendant’s “applicable guideline 
range.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B).  In 2011, the Sentencing 
Commission promulgated Amendment 759, which amended 
the Application Notes to § 1B1.10 to make clear that a 
defendant’s “applicable guideline range” is to be determined 
before any departures and variances.  See U.S.S.G. app. C, 
amend. 759 (Nov. 1, 2011); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A).  
 Appellants argue that they satisfy the first prong of 
§ 3582(c)(2) because their sentences were “based on” 
Guidelines ranges calculated using the subsequently-lowered 
base offense levels in the drug quantity table in Guidelines 
§ 2D1.1.  Even if they are correct, Amendment 759 forecloses 
relief for Appellants, under the second prong of § 3582(c)(2), 
because their pre-departure/pre-variance “applicable 
guideline ranges” were calculated using the base offense 
levels for career offenders in Guidelines § 4B1.1, which have 
not been lowered.  Appellants argue that, since Amendment 
                                                 
 1 Although each Appellant has filed a separate appeal, 
we believe both appeals present similar issues of fact and law.  
We have consolidated the cases for purpose of appeal. 
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759 came into effect after they committed their crimes, 
Amendment 759 is an invalid ex post facto law. 
 We now hold that, although Appellants’ sentences 
were “based on” Guidelines ranges calculated under § 2D1.1, 
Amendment 759 is not an ex post facto law and operates to 
bar a sentence reduction for Appellants.  We will therefore 
affirm the District Court’s judgment in both cases denying 
Appellants’ motions for sentence reduction. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 Appellants were both indicted in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania for 
drug offenses.  Gibson pled guilty in 2008 and Thompson 
pled guilty in 2011.2 
A. Gibson’s Sentencing 
 At Gibson’s sentencing hearing, the District Court 
concluded that Gibson was a “career offender” within the 
meaning of § 4B1.1 and determined that the base offense 
levels for career offenders in § 4B1.1 (the “Career Offender 
Guidelines”) applied.  The District Court calculated Gibson’s 
Career Offender Guidelines range to be 262 to 327 months of 
imprisonment.3 
                                                 
 2 Thompson also pled guilty to a money laundering 
offense, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), as part of the same indictment. 
 3 Gibson’s Career Offender Guidelines range was 
calculated using a criminal history category of VI, as 
provided for in the career offender provisions of § 4B1.1.  His 
Career Offender Guidelines range also took into account a 
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 However, the Government explained at the hearing 
that it did not oppose a downward departure from the Career 
Offender Guidelines range because Gibson had agreed to be 
sentenced at “the high end of the otherwise applicable 
guideline range” (i.e., the Guidelines range calculated using 
the base offense levels from the drug quantity table in 
§ 2D1.1 (the “Drug Guidelines”)).  Gibson App. 101.  The 
District Court calculated Gibson’s Drug Guidelines range to 
be 130 to 162 months of imprisonment.4 
 Pursuant to the parties’ request, the District Court 
departed downwards from the Career Offender Guidelines 
range and sentenced Gibson to 162 months of 
imprisonment—the top end of his Drug Guidelines range. 
B. Thompson’s Sentencing 
                                                                                                             
two-level reduction to the pertinent base offense level in the 
Career Offender Guidelines for his acceptance of 
responsibility and a one-level reduction for his timely 
notification of his intention to plead guilty. 
 
 4 Gibson’s Drug Guidelines range was also calculated 
using a criminal history category of VI.  Gibson had a 
criminal history category of VI both before and after the 
criminal history category enhancement provided for in the 
career offender provisions of § 4B1.1.  His Drug Guidelines 
range also took into account the base offense level reductions 
described in supra note 3. 
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 At Thompson’s sentencing hearing, the District Court 
similarly concluded that Thompson was a “career offender” 
within the meaning of § 4B1.1 and determined that the Career 
Offender Guidelines applied.  The District Court calculated 
Thompson’s Career Offender Guidelines range to be 262 to 
327 months of imprisonment.5 
 However, the parties requested at the hearing that the 
District Court sentence Thompson pursuant to a Rule 
11(c)(1)(B) plea agreement.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 
11(c)(1)(B).  In Thompson’s plea agreement, “[t]he parties 
agree[d] that a . . . variance from the otherwise applicable 
Career Offender [Guidelines] . . . [was] warranted.”6  
Thompson App. 227.  Accordingly, the plea agreement 
calculated the agreed upon Guidelines range of 135 to 168 
months of imprisonment using the pertinent base offense 
                                                 
 5 Thompson’s Career Offender Guidelines range was 
calculated using a criminal history category of VI, as 
provided for in the career offender provisions of § 4B1.1.  His 
Career Offender Guidelines range also took into account a 
three-level reduction to the pertinent base offense level in the 
Career Offender Guidelines for his acceptance of 
responsibility. 
 6 The plea agreement refers to both a departure and 
variance, but the parties’ statements during Thompson’s 
sentencing make clear that they were requesting a variance 
and the District Court’s Statement of Reasons makes clear 
that it determined Thompson’s sentence based only on a 
variance. 
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level from the Drug Guidelines.7  The parties agreed in the 
plea agreement that the “appropriate term of imprisonment” 
was 151 months—the midpoint of Thompson’s Drug 
Guidelines range.  Thompson App. 228.   
 Pursuant to the parties’ request, the District Court 
varied downwards from the Career Offender Guidelines range 
and imposed a sentence of 151 months of imprisonment.  The 
District Court’s Statement of Reasons makes clear that the 
sentence was imposed pursuant to the parties’ plea agreement. 
C. Guidelines Amendments 
 In 2011, after Appellants were sentenced, the 
Sentencing Commission promulgated Amendment 759 to the 
Guidelines, which included an amendment to the Application 
Notes to the policy statement in § 1B1.10.  See U.S.S.G. app. 
C, amend. 759 (Nov. 1, 2011).  Section 1B1.10 provides that 
a district court is not authorized to reduce a sentence under 
§ 3582(c)(2) unless an amendment to the Guidelines has the 
“effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline 
range.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).   
                                                 
 7 Thompson’s Drug Guidelines range was calculated 
using a criminal history category of III, which was 
Thompson’s pertinent criminal history category without the 
criminal history category enhancement provided for in the 
career offender provisions of § 4B1.1.  His Drug Guidelines 
range also took into account a two-level enhancement to the 
pertinent base offense level in the Drug Guidelines for his 
plea of guilty to the money laundering offense and a three-
level reduction for his acceptance of responsibility. 
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 To resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals as to 
whether a defendant’s “applicable guideline range” should be 
determined before or after any departures and variances, the 
amendment to the Application Notes defined the phrase 
“applicable guideline range” in § 1B1.10 to be “the guideline 
range that corresponds to the offense level and criminal 
history category determined . . . before consideration of any 
departure provision in the Guidelines Manual or any 
variance.”  U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 759 (Nov. 1, 2011) 
(emphasis added); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A) (emphasis 
added); see United States v. Pleasant, 704 F.3d 808, 812 (9th 
Cir. 2013).  The amended Application Notes thus preclude a 
defendant from obtaining a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction if 
he has been designated a “career offender” but was actually 
sentenced within a subsequently-lowered non-career offender 
Guidelines range based on a departure or variance.  See 
United States v. Flemming (Flemming III), 723 F.3d 407, 
411−13 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 Several years later, in 2014, the Sentencing 
Commission promulgated Amendment 782 to the Guidelines, 
which retroactively reduced by two levels the base offense 
levels assigned to many drug quantities in the Drug 
Guidelines, including the drug quantities associated with 
Appellants’ offenses.  See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 782 
(Supp. Nov. 1, 2014); U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 788 (Supp. 
Nov. 1, 2014).  Believing that their sentences were 
determined by the Drug Guidelines, Appellants filed 
§ 3582(c)(2) motions for sentence reduction pursuant to the 
amendment lowering the Drug Guidelines.   
 Consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s policy 
statement, the District Court concluded that Appellants’ pre-
departure (Gibson), pre-variance (Thompson) “applicable 
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guideline ranges” were their Career Offender Guidelines 
ranges, which had not been affected by Amendment 782.  
Accordingly, the District Court denied Appellants’ motions 
for sentence reduction.  These appeals followed. 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review over a district court’s decision to 
grant or deny a motion for sentence reduction is typically for 
abuse of discretion.  United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 
154 (3d Cir. 2009).  However, in this case, we exercise 
plenary review because we are presented with “legal 
questions concerning the proper interpretation of the 
Sentencing Guidelines,” United States v. Edwards, 309 F.3d 
110, 112 (3d Cir. 2002), and an ex post facto challenge to the 
Guidelines, United States v. Audinot, 901 F.2d 1201, 1202 
(3d Cir. 1990). 
III. ANALYSIS 
 A district court is authorized under § 3582(c)(2) to 
exercise its discretion to reduce a sentence only “where two 
requirements are satisfied.”  United States v. Flemming 
(Flemming II), 617 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2010).  First, the 
sentence must have been “based on a sentencing range that 
has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing 
Commission.”  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  Second, the sentence 
reduction must be “consistent with applicable policy 
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”  Id.  We 
address each requirement in turn and conclude that, although 
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Appellants meet the first requirement, they cannot meet the 
second. 
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A. Were Appellants’ Sentences “Based On” Their Drug 
Guidelines Ranges? 
 Appellants argue that they meet the first requirement 
under § 3582(c)(2) because  their sentences were “based on” 
Guidelines ranges calculated using the Drug Guidelines in 
§ 2D1.1, which were subsequently lowered by Amendment 
782.  See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 782 (Supp. Nov. 1, 2014).  
The Government responds by pointing us to the District 
Court’s designation of both Appellants as “career offenders” 
subject to the Career Offender Guidelines in § 4B1.1. 
 Our decision in Flemming II is instructive.  In 
Flemming II, the district court designated the defendant a 
“career offender,” and he was thus subject to the Career 
Offender Guidelines.  See 617 F.3d at 255.  However, the 
district court concluded that the career offender designation 
“overstate[d] [the defendant’s] criminal history,” warranting a 
downward departure.  Id. at 255−56.  Based on this 
conclusion, the district court accepted the Government’s 
recommended sentence, which was “at the top of the 
Guidelines range” calculated using the Drug Guidelines.  Id. 
at 256. 
 After examining the foregoing facts, we concluded that 
the defendant’s sentence was, in fact, “based on” the 
Guidelines range calculated using the Drug Guidelines.  See 
id. at 260.  In so concluding, we observed that “[t]he 
Government’s contention that [the defendant’s] sentence was 
‘based on’ the sentencing range calculated under the Career 
Offender Guidelines cannot be squared with the ordinary 
meaning of that phrase” because the district court had 
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sentenced the defendant within the Guidelines range 
calculated using the pertinent base offense level from the 
Drug Guidelines.8  Id. at 259. 
 Similarly, in Gibson’s case, although the District Court 
designated him a “career offender” subject to the Career 
Offender Guidelines, it determined that a downward 
departure was warranted.  Thus, as recommended by the 
Government, the District Court sentenced Gibson to 162 
months of imprisonment—the “high end of the otherwise 
applicable” Guidelines range, Gibson App. 101, which was 
calculated using the pertinent base offense level from the 
Drug Guidelines.  Gibson’s case therefore falls squarely 
                                                 
 8 The Government argues that our decision in 
Flemming III undermines our holding in Flemming II that the 
defendant was sentenced “based on” his Drug Guidelines 
range.  Flemming III did no such thing.  In making its 
argument, the Government conflates the two distinct 
requirements of § 3582(c)(2).  See United States v. Ware, 694 
F.3d 527, 533−34 (3d Cir. 2012); Flemming II, 617 F.3d at 
260 n.11.  Our decision in Flemming III only addressed the 
second requirement of § 3582(c)(2)—whether a sentence 
reduction for the defendant would have been “consistent with 
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission.”  See Flemming III, 723 F.3d at 410 (quoting 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)).  The Government conceded in 
Flemming III that the first requirement—whether the 
defendant’s sentence was “based on” his Drug Guidelines 
range—had been met.  See id. at 410 n.2. 
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within our decision in Flemming II.  As such, we conclude 
that his sentence was “based on” his Drug Guidelines range. 
 Thompson’s case presents a permutation of the facts in 
Flemming II, but the result is nonetheless the same.  Although 
the District Court designated Thompson a “career offender” 
subject to the Career Offender Guidelines, as in Flemming II, 
it did not sentence him within his Career Offender Guidelines 
range.  Rather, the District Court’s Statement of Reasons 
makes clear that it imposed his sentence pursuant to the 
parties’ plea agreement, which provided for a “variance from 
the otherwise applicable Career Offender [Guidelines].”  
Thompson App. 227.  The plea agreement contained an 
explicit calculation of Thompson’s Guidelines range using the 
pertinent base offense level from the Drug Guidelines and 
then recommended a sentence of 151 months of 
imprisonment—the midpoint of Thompson’s Drug Guidelines 
range.   
 Thus, in sentencing Thompson to 151 months of 
imprisonment, as in Flemming II, the District Court 
“reverted” to the Drug Guidelines range and “imposed a 
sentence within that range.”  Flemming II, 617 F.3d at 259.  If 
Amendment 782 had been in effect when Thompson was 
sentenced, we are convinced that the parties would have 
incorporated the lower pertinent base offense level from the 
Drug Guidelines into their plea agreement and the District 
Court would have accordingly sentenced Thompson based on 
the resultant lower Drug Guidelines range.  See id.  Under 
these circumstances, we have no trouble concluding that 
Thompson’s sentence of 151 months of imprisonment was 
“based on” his Drug Guidelines range. 
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 Because the District Court’s sentences of Appellants 
were “based on” their Drug Guidelines ranges, and those 
ranges were subsequently lowered by Amendment 782, 
Appellants have satisfied the first requirement of 
§ 3582(c)(2). 
B. Would Sentence Reductions Be Consistent with the 
Sentencing Commission’s Policy Statement in § 1B1.10? 
 Appellants acknowledge that, after Amendment 759, 
their “applicable guideline ranges” under the Sentencing 
Commission’s policy statement in § 1B1.10 are their Career 
Offender Guidelines ranges.  Accordingly, they concede that 
they cannot satisfy the second requirement of § 3582(c)(2) 
because Amendment 782 only lowered their Drug Guidelines 
ranges.  See Flemming III, 723 F.3d at 411−13.  However, 
Appellants argue that Amendment 759 violates the Ex Post 
Facto Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, 
because it was enacted after they committed their crimes and 
retroactively denies them the benefit of a sentence reduction 
to which they otherwise would have been entitled.  We 
disagree. 
 The Ex Post Facto Clause “bar[s] enactments which, 
by retroactive operation, increase the punishment for a crime 
after its commission.”  Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 249 
(2000).  Accordingly, in assessing whether a law violates the 
Ex Post Facto Clause, we compare the punishment attached to 
the defendant’s crime at the time of his offense with the 
punishment retroactively attached to the defendant’s crime 
after the enactment of the alleged ex post facto law.  If the 
retroactive “change in law presents a ‘sufficient risk of 
increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered 
crimes,’” then it violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.  Peugh v. 
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United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 (2013) (quoting Garner, 
529 U.S. at 250) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 In arguing that Amendment 759 satisfies this standard, 
Appellants rely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Weaver v. 
Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981).  In Weaver, the defendant was 
sentenced to prison for fifteen years in Florida for a murder.  
Id. at 25.  At the time of the defendant’s offense, a Florida 
statute provided a formula for calculating good conduct 
credits that operated to shorten the sentence of each 
qualifying prisoner.  Id. at 26.  After the defendant was 
sentenced, the Florida Legislature repealed the statute and 
enacted a new formula that reduced the number of good 
conduct credits available to each qualifying prisoner.  Id. at 
26−27. 
 Florida contended that the new law did not violate the 
Ex Post Facto Clause because the old formula was not part of 
the defendant’s “punishment” and thus its replacement with 
the less lenient formula did not retroactively increase the 
punishment for the defendant’s crime.  Id. at 31−32.  In 
rejecting that argument, the Supreme Court observed that the 
“prospect of the gain time”9 was “one determinant of [the 
defendant’s] prison term” and was “a significant factor 
entering into both the defendant’s decision to plea bargain 
and the judge’s calculation of the sentence to be imposed.”  
                                                 
 9 “Gain time” was the phrase Florida used to describe 
“various kinds of time credited to reduce a prisoner’s prison 
term,” including good conduct credits.  Weaver, 450 U.S. at 
25 n.1. 
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Id. at 32.  Accordingly, the defendant’s “effective sentence 
[was] altered once [that] determinant [was] changed.”  Id. 
 Appellants’ reliance on Weaver is misplaced because it 
ignores a critical distinction between their cases and 
Weaver—the good conduct formula in Weaver was already in 
existence at the time of the defendant’s offense.  Because the 
formula was already in existence when the defendant in 
Weaver committed his crime, and operated to reduce his 
sentence, its abrogation retroactively increased the “quantum 
of punishment” attached to his crime.  Id. at 33 (quoting 
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294 (1977)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 By contrast, the Drug Guidelines reduction in 
Amendment 782 was not enacted until 2014, years after 
Appellants’ offenses.  See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 782 
(Supp. Nov. 1, 2014).  Since Amendment 782 was not in 
effect at the time of Appellants’ offenses, unlike the good 
conduct formula in Weaver, it was neither a “determinant” of 
Appellants’ sentences nor a component of their “effective 
sentence[s]” at that time and so we do not view it as 
constituting part of their “punishment.”  Weaver, 450 U.S. at 
31−32.  Therefore, the abrogation of Amendment 782 with 
respect to Appellants through Amendment 759 did not 
retroactively “increas[e] the measure of punishment attached 
to [Appellants’] crimes.”10  Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2082 
                                                 
 10 We also note that the Drug Guidelines reduction in 
Amendment 782 was enacted several years after Amendment 
759 and so the sentence reduction associated with 
Amendment 782 was never applicable to Appellants.  When 
enacted, Amendment 759 operated to deny Appellants the 
benefit of a sentence reduction that did not yet exist.  And so, 
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(quoting Garner, 529 U.S. at 250) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 Put another way, rendering Appellants ineligible for 
the sentence reduction associated with Amendment 782 does 
not lengthen the period of time they will spend incarcerated—
it merely denies them the benefit of a discretionary reduction 
of that period of time.  See Garner, 529 U.S. at 255 
(observing that an ex post facto violation exists where 
“retroactive application [of a new law] will result in a longer 
period of incarceration than under the earlier rule” (emphasis 
added)); Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 442−43 (1997).  As 
the Supreme Court observed in Weaver, “[c]ritical to relief 
under the Ex Post Facto Clause is not an individual’s right to 
less punishment, but the lack of fair notice and governmental 
restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond 
what was prescribed when the crime was consummated.”  
Weaver, 450 U.S. at 30 (emphasis omitted). 
 Accordingly, we conclude that Appellants’ ex post 
facto argument is without merit.  In so concluding, we join 
the other Circuits that have considered similar ex post facto 
challenges to § 1B1.10 of the Guidelines.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Waters, 771 F.3d 679 (9th Cir. 2014) (per curiam); 
United States v. Diggs, 768 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2014); United 
States v. Colon, 707 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2013).  Given that 
Amendment 759 presents no ex post facto problem, the 
Sentencing Commission’s policy statement in § 1B1.10 
precludes Appellants’ requested sentence reductions and so 
                                                                                                             
today, Amendment 759 merely operates to deny Appellants 
the benefit of a sentence reduction to which they have never 
been entitled. 
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Appellants have not satisfied the second requirement of 
§ 3582(c)(2). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court in both cases denying Appellants’ 
motions for sentence reduction. 
